Marketing Cooperatives' Re-engineering: Influences among Organizational Attributes, Strategic Attributes & Performance by Benos, T. et al.
Marketing Cooperatives’ Re-engineering:  
Influences among Organizational Attributes, Strategic Attributes & Performance 
 
 
Theo  Benos1 
Dept. of Marketing & Supply Chain Management, Maastricht University, The Netherlands 
P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
E-mail: t.benos@mw.unimaas.nl  
 
Nikos Kalogeras 
Depts. of Finance and Marketing & Supply Chain Management, Maastricht University, The Nether-
lands 
P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands 
E-mail: n.kalogeras@finance.unimaas.nl  
 
Dept. of Agricultural & Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  
326 Mumford Hall, MC-710, 1301 W. Gregory Drive, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.  
 
Frans J.H.M. Verhees 
Dept. of Marketing & Consumer Behavior, Wageningen University, The Netherlands 
Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands.  
E-mail: Frans.Verhees@wur.nl  
 
Joost M.E. Pennings 
Maastricht University, Depts. of Marketing & Supply Chain Management & Finance, Tongersestraat 
53, 6211 LM, Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, 
326, Mumford Hall, MC-710, 1301 West Gregory Drive, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA  
 
Wageningen University, Marketing & Consumer Behavior Group, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN, Wagen-




                                                 
1 Corresponding author: Dept. of  Marketing, Maastricht University, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The 




Marketing Cooperatives’ Re-engineering:  
Influences among Organizational Attributes, Strategic Attributes & Performance 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we expand the agribusiness co-op literature by studying the re-engineering 
process of marketing cooperatives (co-ops). More specifically we discuss and empirically ex-
amine organizational innovations adopted by marketing co-ops in Greece. We hypothesize 
three types of relationships: a) the influence of organizational (i.e., collective ownership, con-
trol and cost/benefit allocation) and strategic (i.e., market and brand orientation) attributes on 
organizational performance; b) the influence of organizational attributes on market orientation; 
and c) influences among strategic attributes. Data for this study were collected from a large-
scale survey with CEOs of marketing co-op in Greece. The results show that strategic attributes 
have a much greater influence on organizational performance than organizational attributes 
have, as only a few among the examined elements of re-engineered attributes have a (marginal) 
positive influence on performance. This result raises the question whether the influence of the 
re-engineered structures on performance has been over-emphasized in the co-op literature.  
Moreover, the results demonstrate positive influences among the strategic attributes of co-ops, 
contrary to the non-significant results of organizational attributes on market orientation. This 
may imply that organizational attributes do not seem to act as drivers or barriers to the adop-
tion of strategic attributes, and, hence, reinforces the conclusion that emphasis in co-op theory 
and practice should also be also placed on the strategies and tactics that co-ops should adopt 
and implement in order to capture market benefits. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
Research in agribusiness has analyzed the re-engineering of cooperative (co-op) structures as 
mechanisms designed to accommodate end-user demand (e.g., Meulenberg, 1979; 2000; Nils-
son, 2001; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Kalogeras et al., 2007).  One of the 
arguments highlighted in agribusiness research and practice is that producer-owned organisa-
tions create value for their owners, but often fail to respond to rapid market changes because 
they lack a well-developed strategic focus (Van Dijk & Mackel, 1991; Peterson & Anderson, 
1996).  This lack of connection to demand limits the financial viability of co-ops and requires 
the re-engineering of their organizational and strategic orientation. Co-op’s choices among or-
ganizational (e.g., ownership, governance) and strategic attributes (e.g., customer-focused 
strategies) are crucial in dynamic markets or periods of transition where product adaptations 
are required (Goldsmith & Gow, 2005, Kalogeras et al., 2009). 
Literature proposes a variety of organizational models for agribusiness co-ops (Cook, 
1995; Nilsson, 1998; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004; Van Bekkum, 2001; Chaddad & Cook, 2004).  
Classifications for co-op models often use the unique attributes of co-ops as core-criteria.  
These attributes encompass the definition of co-ops as user-owned and user-controlled busi-
nesses that distribute benefits on the basis of use (USDA, 1995).  The extent to which co-ops 
relax their definitional attributes (i.e., attribute elements) results in organizational forms that 
range from traditional (i.e., collectively organized based on the principle of equality) to re-
engineered models (i.e., proportional or investor-owned firm -IOF-alike) (Kalogeras et al., 
2007).  The proposed models are purported to better facilitate the adaptation of co-ops to agri-
cultural industrialization, and their response to market challenges.  Several strategic attributes, 
however, have been identified in business literature as having the same purpose.  Notably, 
market, brand, and entrepreneurial orientation (e.g., Berthon et al., 2008; Cano et al., 2004; 
Kirca et al., 2005; Matsuno et al., 2002) are dominant attributes that improve performance and 
enhance organizations to maintain co-alignment with competitive, technological, social, politi-
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cal, and turbulent market environments which occasionally pose threats and challenges to con-
tinued survival and effectiveness. 
Despite the recognised need for better understanding, the influence of organizational at-
tributes on strategic attributes and performance of co-ops, limited research has been devoted to 
the examination of these relationships. The rich economics literature on co-op competitiveness 
often does not account for historical, sociological and behavioural aspects of co-op entrepre-
neurship and broader implications for the re-engineering of their core attributes (Gray & 
Mooney, 1988).  Past studies on the co-ops’ performance have either focused primarily on fi-
nancial analysis, such as balance sheet ratio assessments (e.g., Gentzoglanis, 1997; Parliament 
et al.,  1990) or have maintained an analytical focus (e.g., Peterson & Anderson, 1996; Nilsson, 
1998; Meulenberg, 1979; 2000). 
  Moreover, empirical research addressing relationships among changing organizational 
attributes, strategic attributes and performance of co-ops is scant with a few notable exceptions. 
To the best of our knowledge, only the study of Kyriakopoulos et al. (2004) sheds light on the 
influence of structural attributes on co-op outcomes.  The authors introduced and empirically 
tested a conceptual framework regarding the influence of organizational attributes and entre-
preneurial culture on market orientation and performance of the agrifood co-ops in the Nether-
lands. The starting point of their analysis relied on the a priori classification of ideal attribute 
elements entailed in the traditional and proportional co-op model.  However, ideal classifica-
tion schemes may not capture decision context specificities and not fully account for empirical 
anchorage (Verhaegen & Van Huylenbroek, 2002) and actual complexity of (co-op) organiza-
tions  (Borgen & Hergenes, 2005). That is, the a priori set-up of evaluation criteria (e.g., at-
tribute elements entailed in a classification scheme) may mask the natural (i.e., actual) group-
ings of firms that could explain potential influences among organizational and strategic design 
parameters and performance when certain environmental conditions occur (McKelvey, 1982). 
Hence, the conceptualization and assessment of a framework accounting for influences among 
 organizational attributes, strategic attributes and performance of co-ops when a certain envi-
ronmental condition occurs (e.g., policy reform), may further the understanding of researchers 
and policy makers regarding the re-engineering of co-op structure and strategic behaviour. 
In this paper we expand the literature by discussing and examining organizational inno-
vations adopted by marketing co-ops resulting from policy reforms. Such changes in the legal 
and institutional environment may substantially affect co-ops’ structure and market behavior ( 
Oustapassidis et al., 1995; Chaddad & Cook, 2004).  We develop an actual, real life, classifica-
tion scheme for classifying organizational attributes of marketing co-ops that may or may not 
have been modified after the changes in the legal environment. As Cook (1995) and Hansmann 
(1996) have discussed, the study on whether anachronistic business forms adopt organizational 
innovations and develop their strategic focus when legal changes are introduced –
organizational, regulatory or tax laws - is of value. Here, we are particularly  interested in em-
pirically studying the influence of re-engineered organizational attributes resulting from policy 
reforms on market orientation and performance of co-ops, the influence of strategic attributes 
(entrepreneurial, market, and brand orientation) on co-ops’ performance, and the influences 
among strategic attributes of co-ops (e.g., the influence of entrepreneurial orientation on mar-
ket orientation). Knowledge about these influences may be important to policy makers, manag-
ers and board members who need to foster specific organizational innovations and strategies 
that increase the performance of co-ops. 
 Data for this study were collected from a large-scale survey with marketing co-op 
CEOs in Greece in the spring of 2006.  In 2000 a new legal Act (National Hellenic Act - NHA 
2810/2000) was enforced in Greece.  This undertaking removed several legal barriers and per-
mitted the re-engineering of co-op attributes.  The flexibility of the new law has formally chal-
lenged marketing co-ops in Greece to abandon their anachronistic (traditional) organization 
and passive-oriented market role (lliopoulos, 2001). The current decision context presents a 
unique opportunity to develop an actual classification of “traditional” and “re-engineered” at-
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tribute elements using as a turning point the policy reform regarding developments in the co-op 
entrepreneurship in the country.  Agribusiness co-ops are dominant in the Greek economy, par-
ticularly, in food and drink industries. The high nutritious quality and health standards of sev-
eral agrifood products in Greece (e.g., olive-oil, dairy-products and wine) are globally recog-
nized (Damianos et al., 1998).  However, the majority of Greek co-ops lack well-developed 
marketing strategies and expertise. The vast majority of them are un-anchored by end-user de-
mand and maintain a traditional ownership and governance structure (Baourakis et al., 2002).  
Hence, the empirical investigation using the decision context of Greek co-ops is challenging 
and it may provide interesting perspectives on whether and how the re-engineering of co-op at-
tributes affects strategic behavior and performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first elaborate on the develop-
ment of a dichotomous classification entailing organizational attributes elements ranging 
within the “traditional vs. re-engineered cooperative” co-op paradigm, followed by an elabora-
tion on strategic attributes. Then, specific hypotheses regarding the influences among organiza-
tional attributes, strategic attributes and performance are formulated.  After discussing the sur-
vey design and operationalization of the measures, the empirical findings are presented. 
Finally, implications and suggestions ensue. 
 
2   CO-OP ATTRIBUTES 
We classify attribute elements of marketing co-ops by using recent advances in co-op literature 
and empirical observations. Our aim is to draw-up a classification scheme which includes an 
original synthesis of key attribute elements which serve as a basis for further analyses. Empha-
sis is placed, therefore, on the specificities of our decision context which are studied by using 
an inductive approach (McKelvey, 1982). In this section we elaborate first on these specifici-
ties of the organizational attributes and subsequently we discuss particular strategic attributes. 
 
 2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
A co-op is  a user-owned, user-controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis of use 
(USDA, 1995). This definition is well accepted in the international community of agricultural 
economists and encompasses the basic organizational attributes on which the co-op structures 
rely (Van Dijk et al.,1997). Co-op structures comprising these attributes may be organized 
along two different extremes ranging from “traditional” to “re-engineered” (IOF-like)  (Van 
Bekkum, 2001). 
The traditional organizational model of agribusiness co-ops entail: exclusive members’ 
ownership, democratic control, and uniform pricing policy (Barton, 1989). In contrast, the re-
engineered co-op model is composed of individualized equity, non-member parties funding, 
proportional decision control, and allocation of benefits through price and personal shares (see: 
Chaddad & Cook, 2004). The degree of re-engineering is assumed to better accommodate the 
strategic-oriented goals of co-op business firms (Van Bekkum, 2001) and reinforce members’ 
commitment and willingness to invest in co-op operations (Kalogeras et al., 2007). 
Below we thoroughly discuss the attributes entailed in the dichotomous classification 
(traditional vs. re-engineered co-op structure) in the light of policy reforms. This involves look-
ing into the case of agribusiness co-ops in Greece that have been challenged to restructure their 
organizational attributes after the National Hellenic Act (2810/2000) came into force in 2000. 
Empirical observations based on the determination of the articles of the new Act, relevant lit-
erature dealing with agricultural co-ops in Greece, and discussions with co-op experts and pol-
icy-makers in Greece and abroad were used as inputs for making up the dichotomous classifi-
cation. 
 
 2.1.1 Co-ops in Greece:  A New Organizational Challenge 
Co-op business firms are dominant in the Greek agrifood industry. There are almost 6500 agri-
cultural co-ops with 750000 members, totals which are amongst the highest in Europe 
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(COGECA, 2000; EUROPA, 2005). These co-ops are involved in activities such as farm input 
supplies, product processing, and marketing of agricultural produce, and imports/exports 
(Baourakis et al., 2002). The organizational pyramid of co-ops in Greece consists of three lev-
els.  Co-ops that integrate farmers from the same geographical area are defined as first-order 
co-ops. They are responsible for commercializing their farmers’ production, although other 
services are also offered (e.g., supplies, technical support). Even though they represent a first 
movement towards higher levels of integration in the agro-industry, their local orientation lim-
its the volume and number of products they offer to their clients. Second order co-ops (Unions 
of Agricultural Co-ops-ACOs) were established to commercialize all, or portions, of the pro-
duction of various first order co-ops. Most of the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and 
Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) products in Greece are also marketed by ACOs 
(EUROPA, 2005). At the peak of the pyramid is the Panhellenic Confederation of Agricultural 
Co-ops (PA.SE.GES). 
Although the sheer number of co-ops in the Greek agro-industrial sector indicates that 
collective action is flourishing, the total turnover of agribusiness co-ops in Greece (0,8 billion 
EUROs) is 18-times less than the European Union’s (EU) average (14.2 billion EUROs) (MA-
ICh, 2000). Studies provided evidence that in the midst of the 90s, the majority of marketing 
co-ops in Greece were medium-sized (in terms of employment and turnover), traditionally or-
ganized, their marketing approaches were generally weak, with products being far less differ-
entiated than those of large-private firms and their strategies were short-term and ill-defined 
(Oustapassidis et al., 1995; Ananiadis et al., 2003). Lambrinopoulou et al. (2006) have identi-
fied the intermediate supply chain structures, the high degree of past governmental interven-
tion, the missing social cohesiveness between co-op actors, and the lack of well-structured and 
focused strategic orientation as key barriers to successful collective action in Greece. Most 
Greek co-ops operating in downstream value-added activities (i.e., processing, marketing) lack 
 entrepreneurial vision and are not able to develop generic competitive advantages in the form 
of specialization through very selective market segmentation (MAICh, 2000). 
In 2000, a new legal Act (NHA 2810/2000) sanctioned in Greece, which granted great 
flexibility as it permitted the re-engineering of their organizational attributes. The new Act has 
offered a unique opportunity to Greek co-ops to overcome their structural inefficiencies.  The 
re-engineering of co-ops in Greece may enhance their strategic focus and competitiveness.  
Moreover, the rapidly changing marketing trends in the agrifood sector world-wide and the re-
cent changes of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, challenge Greek co-ops to 
reconsider their organizations (lliopoulos, 2001). 
We conducted an in-depth study of the new NHA 2810/2000 and we further discussed 
our inferences with several co-op experts and policy makers in Greece and abroad (e.g., the 
Netherlands, US). The review of the relevant literature, the study of the NHA 2810/2000, and 
the discussions, informed the development of a dichotomous classification with respect to the 
identification of attribute elements included in the traditional and re-engineered models. Below 




The new Act stipulates that only members have voting rights, but it is specified that co-ops are 
free to introduce voting systems proportional to production rights. The voting rights of mem-
bers, however, have to be in proportion to patronage.  An upper limit of 3 votes per member for 
the first order co-ops and 5 votes per member-co-op for second order co-ops is suggested. Cor-
porate control regarding resource allocation decisions (e.g., allocation of net income, approval 
of big investment projects and annual financial statements) are exercised by the member-
patrons through their general assembly.  However, the Board of Directors (BoD: elected repre-
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sentatives by members) is allowed to transfer to professional experts almost all the manage-
ment decision rights regarding tactical and operational issues. 
 
Ownership Attribute 
The ownership attribute involves elements relevant to the financial instruments used to deter-
mine the claims of members on collective ownership rights, the nature of the right to residual 
claims, and the financial entry conditions.  The NHA 2810/2000 states that co-ops have the 
right to issue non-voting preferred shares with fixed returns alongside the voting stock. It is 
also stated that non-members are also entitled to purchase this separate class of stock.  In an ef-
fort to make these preferred shares highly attractive to investors, co-op’s memorandum of as-
sociation may stipulate that some incentives are provided (e.g., dividends on those shares from 
the co-op’s annual net income).  Alternatively, members or non-members may claim owner-
ship rights when co-ops would set-up public limited companies (Ltd). In this case, co-ops hold 
the majority of equity ownership for developing strategic synergies with other co-ops or inves-
tors (non-members). Those Ltds are defined as “Cooperative Enterprises” and their stocks 
should always be registered (nominal shares). The Ltds’ equity can only be transferred after the 
completion of the formalities required by law.  Moreover, the law provides extra incentive for 
members to further invest in co-op activities. When stocks of co-op enterprises are for sale, 
other co-ops or co-op members that hold shares already should always have priority over ex-
ternal investors. 
The regulation related to the alignment of equity investment with patronage suggests 
upfront equity investment by members to co-ops.  Members are free to decide whether to ac-
quire additional stocks or not, but always in proportion to patronage. So, the level of the up-
front equity investment and issuance of extra voting stock in proportion to patronage is a mem-
bers’ choice. Furthermore, the transferability of ownership rights is left upon BoD to decide 
(i.e., whether stocks are transferred to members or not), but the appraisal of rights is left upon 
 member-patrons’ preference and the relevant decision is formed via the general assembly (i.e., 
whether to increase or decrease the value of the voting stock owned by individual members).  
Also, it is suggested that members decide whether the voting stock is interest bearing.  Strictly 
speaking, however, the NHA 2810/2000 does not mention that ownership rights are really ap-
preciable, but, at least, points out how members’ remuneration for their contribution to the col-
lective equity capital, could be indirectly compensated for the opportunity cost of their invested 
risk capital. The regulatory items that refer to redeemability and tradability of ownership rights 
do not introduce any changes. Members enjoy the right to have the nominal value of their indi-
vidualized equity refunded upon exit, whereas their ownership rights can not be tradable 
among them. The latter implies the absence of secondary internal markets within co-ops. 
Although the element regarding the allocation of net income relates to the cost/benefit 
attribute, we consider (after having discussed this issue with several co-op experts) that it is 
even better tied-up to the ownership attribute, since the net income that an individual member 
receives is a function of his/her investment in the co-op and, hence, to his/her ownership titles. 
The relevant articles and associated regulations refer to the choices that a co-op business firm 
has for allocating net income.  In the traditional organized co-ops the net income was allocated 
through product prices.  The NHA 2810/2000 provides that the distribution of net income can 
be made through dividends in proportion to patronage or it can be retained as an individualized 
short-term loan from members to the co-op or even allocated for an investment project.  Only 
the general assembly decides on the net income’s distribution.  It is mentioned that at least 10% 
of net income should be reserved for the unallocated form of equity (reserve funds) until the 
value of the latter equals the value of the individualized voting stock.  Thereafter, no amount is 
retained, unless the value or the amount of individualized voting stock is increased. In this 
situation the unallocated equity has to be re-adjusted and the retained earnings mechanism has 
to be reintroduced.  Hence, net income allocation cannot be applied as a price supplement and 
can only be returned as a dividend in proportion to patronage.  Finally, the new act states that 
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the memorandum of co-op association may set a minimum period of time that a member has 
the right/obligation to patronize the co-op. 
 
Cost/Benefits Attribute 
The Act does not particularly specify the “price paid to members” rule which implies that the 
responsibility in making such a decision rests on member preferences as reflected through their 
contractual agreement.  For the first time in the history of Greek co-ops, however, it is sug-
gested that co-ops are free to adopt a differentiated pricing policy in terms of volume, quality 
and produce content to reflect as much as possible the handling costs and market returns of 
each member’s produce.  The price level may be cross-subsidized with returns on transaction-
based investment (e.g., account for product quantity and certain quality standards) or reflect the 
market equilibrium price paid through separate dividends (i.e., returns on capital invested).  
The supply management is determined also through the regulations which specify the delivery 
rights agreement. The latter may be obligatory whereas, co-ops are free to take a stance on the 
imposition of sanctions against members not fulfilling their delivery obligations. 
 
The information from the above discussion on the re-engineering opportunities of at-
tribute elements in agribusiness co-ops in Greece, constitute the basis for the development of 
the dichotomous classification scheme.  After discussing excessively the organizational inno-
vations introduced for Greek co-ops with experts in Greece and abroad, we considered that our 
dichotomous classification scheme should entail all the aforementioned elements.  However, 
only these elements which are upon members’ or BOD’s choice to be settled, are utilized for 
further analysis.  The NHA 2810/2000 lays down specific rules regarding the elements of net 
income allocation (no price supplement is received), redeemability of ownership titles (refund 
of nominal value on exit), and exchange of ownership rights among members (no tradable 
rights), and, hence, these elements are simply presented in our classification scheme but will 
 not be examined further.  That is, these elements do not allow for the choice of adoption, but 
rather have to be compulsorily implemented as defined by the NHA 2810/2000.  Table 1 de-
scribes the various attribute elements entailed in the traditionally and re-engineered co-op 
structure. 
The strategic attributes which are hypothesized to influence performance of co-ops and 
to be influenced by the re-engineered attributes of co-ops, are discussed in the next sub-
sections.  After elaborating on these concepts, we present our hypotheses.  We pose specific 
hypotheses regarding the influence of the organizational and strategic attributes on the per-
formance of co-ops.  Following Kyriakopoulos, et al. (2004) we view the performance of agri-
cultural co-ops as a volatile variable resulting from the rapidly changing agrifood environment.  
Evaluating whether a co-op achieves its objectives is far more complex than using simple mar-
ket-based performance measures as in the case of IOFs (Cook, 1994).  Gray and Mooney 
(1988), Katz (1997), Sexton and Iskow (1988) contend that, due to the absence of secondary 
markets for co-op issued-stocks (and this is a relevant element to our decision context), simple 
market-based measures (e.g., financial ratio analysis) may mask crucial insights when one 
studies co-op performance.  In addition, objective measures of performance are often difficult 
to obtain (e.g., Dess & Robinson, 1984).  These arguments prompted us to view co-op’s per-
formance as a multidimensional subjective concept which is comprised of market and financial 
indicators proposed by previous studies in business literature (Deshpande et al., 1993; Cadogan 
et al., 2002). 
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2.2 STRATEGIC ATTRIBUTES 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation 
Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the processes, practices, and decision-making activities re-
quired to enter new or established markets with new or existing products (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996). An entrepreneurial orientation involves innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness 
(Matsuno et al., 2002). These elements may vary independently but together they give rise to 
an entrepreneurial business organization (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). 
 
Market Orientation 
Market orientation has been conceptualized from both behavioral and cultural perspectives and 
has been proven to enhance business performance (Cano et al., 2004; Homburg & Pflesser, 
2000; Kirca et al., 2005). Kohli and Jaworski (1990) define market orientation as  “the organi-
zation wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer needs, 
dissemination of the intelligence across departments and organization wide responsiveness to 
it” (pp.6).  Alternatively, Narver and Slater (1990) take a cultural perspective. They define 
market orientation as “the organizational culture and climate that most effectively encourages 
the behaviors that are necessary for the creation of superior value for buyers and, thus, con-
tinuous superior profit for business” (pp. 21). These two definitions encompass that market ori-
entation consists of three behavioral components: customer orientation, competitor orientation 
and interfunctional coordination. 
 
Brand Orientation 
Brand orientation  refers to the processes of the organization that revolve around the creation, 
development, and protection of brand identity in an ongoing interaction with target customers 
for the achievement of competitive market advantages (Urde, 1994).  The proper use of brand-
 ing creates customer loyalty and functions as an entry barrier (Kotler & Keller, 2006). Custom-
ers more often view brands as an orientation guide for their buying decisions, especially in en-
vironments of increasing communication and information flows (e.g., agrifood industry) (Hanf 
& Kühl, 2005).  However, creating, developing, investing in and protecting a brand (i.e., adopt-
ing a brand orientation) signals a choice of strategy (Urde, 1999).  Management of brands 
should be approached strategically and take a long-term perspective, thereby facilitating the 
implementation of strategies and tactics (Davis, 2002). 
 
3 HYPOTHESES 
Inspired by Kyriakopoulos et al. (2004), we hypothesize that re-engineered organizational at-
tributes of co-ops influence their market orientation and performance. Following recent ad-
vances in marketing science and agribusiness economics (e.g., Moorman, 1995; Matsuno et al., 
2002; Verhees & Meulenberg, 2004), we extend this modeling framework by hypothesizing 
that the strategic attributes (entrepreneurial, market, and brand orientation) also influence the 
performance of co-ops and that particular strategic attributes have an impact on some other 
strategic attributes (e.g., entrepreneurial orientation influences brand orientation).  Figure 1 



























Figure 1: Influences among Co-op Attributes, Strategic Attributes and Performance 
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3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES – PERFORMANCE 
 
Proportional voting may motivate members, especially large-sized producers (whose capital 
and patronage is instrumental for business success) to invest further in co-op activities.  For in-
stance, large-sized members (in terms of produce marketed, firm-size, ownership of landhold-
ings, etc) engaged in a traditional organized co-op structure are essential to the continued suc-
cess of co-ops (Reynolds, 1997). They are often capable of investing in co-op activities and 
projects which have long-term payoff, but co-op practice has shown that they feel that their 
economic interests are not captured by the traditional “one-member one-vote” rule (Royer, 
1995).  Members of any size often lack market-expertise and management capabilities. As co-
ops expand and diversify, the need for hiring to employ professionals to deal with crucial stra-
tegic, tactical and operational decisions increases (Cook, 1994).  Increasing the responsibilities 
assigned to professional management makes co-ops more viable and efficient, which allows 
them to better serve members’ needs (Adrian & Green, 2001).  Dynamic and professional 
management makes co-ops efficient and competitive (Van Dijk, 1996).  Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that: 
 
H1a: Re-engineered control arrangements in co-ops positively influence co-ops’ perform-
ance 
 
Re-engineered co-ops relax the traditional ownership arrangements with the aim to rein-
force the investment incentives of members.  Increased willingness of membership to invest 
within co-op activities is expected to positively influence performance (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
1999). That is, the establishment of internal capital markets provides investment opportunities 
to further invest risk capital within co-op operations. Recent research has also demonstrated 
 that reengineered ownership features enhance co-ops’ performance (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; 
Van Bekkum, 2001). More formally: 
 
H1b: Re-engineered ownership arrangements in co-ops positively influence co-ops’ perform-
ance 
 
Co-ops are continuously challenged to respond timely to markets with a constant supply 
of products bearing specific quality standards. Control of supply has been discussed in co-op 
literature as a significant determinant of operational success for co-ops (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
2000).  Besides, the foodstuffs produced by co-ops are, typically, subject to value decay over 
time and demand a well synchronized value chain (Goldsmith & Gow, 2005).  Enforceable de-
livery agreements and differential pricing schemes can thus be important means of achieving 
the goals of constant supply and synchronization.  In traditional co-ops, members may act op-
portunistically and shirk on quality and deliveries because they are not held liable for such be-
havior (Harris et al., 1996).  That is, by adopting a differentiated pricing policy in terms of vol-
ume, quality and produce content in order to reflect as much as possible the handling costs and 
market returns of each member’s produce, co-ops may better satisfy the multi-needs of differ-
ent groups of members (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
H1c: Re-engineered cost/benefit allocation arrangements in co-ops positively influence co-
ops’ performance 
 
3.2 STRATEGIC ATTRIBUTES – PERFORMANCE  
Overwhelming evidence for a positive influence of market orientation on performance has 
been reported and analyzed in business and marketing literature (Cano et al., 2004; Kirca et al., 
2005).   Market orientation provides the firm with market sensing and customer linking capa-
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bilities. Understanding and anticipating customer needs subsequently increases firm innova-
tiveness, new product success, customer’s perceived product quality, customer satisfaction, 
customer loyalty and ultimately performance (e.g., Kirca et al., 2005). The relationship be-
tween market orientation and performance seems particularly strong for manufacturing firms, 
like most agribusiness co-ops (Meulenberg, 2000; Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Van Dijk and Van 
Boekel, 2004). Moreover, the relationship seems to hold for medium-sized firms, like most 
marketing co-ops in Greece (Pelham, 2000; Verhees & Meulenberg, 2004). We hypothesize 
that: 
 
H2: Market orientation of co-ops positively influences co-ops’ performance 
 
Brands increase performance because they create a higher price premium and higher 
market shares (Aaker, 1996). The chain of effects from introducing brands to higher perform-
ance, however, is complicated (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001). Consumers may pay more for a 
product/service of a particular brand because they are mostly satisfied with the merits of spe-
cific attributes and cues of this brand rather than with its alternatives. Greater market shares 
may result from loyal customers. Brands may even reduce costs because they reduce marketing 
costs (since the brand is already familiar to already existing or potential clients), attract new 
customers and increase trade leverage. Awareness of the potential of brands puts brands at the 
center of company strategies (Urde, 1994). This enforces brand-oriented companies to empha-
size on creating and efficiently using brand equity. Brand equity is used as leverage in all as-
pects of business management (Wong & Meriless, 2005). Brand orientation, therefore, in-
creases brand equity by stimulating the chain of effects from product value and brand 
differentiation to customer loyalty, higher prices, higher market shares and eventually higher 
performance (Reid et al., 2005). Moreover, research has shown that European co-ops which 
pursue and implement product differentiation aiming at the development of solid trade brands, 
 perform much better than co-ops with limited branded market presence (e.g., Mauget & De-
clerck, 1996). More formally: 
 
H3: Brand orientation of co-ops positively influences co-ops’  performance 
 
    Recent advances in business research identify a positive relationship between entrepreneu-
rial orientation and performance (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Matsuno et al., 2002; Naman & 
Slevin, 1993; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). Innovativeness, one of the elements of entrepreneu-
rial orientation, is often referred to as a “basic function” of firms (Deshpande et al., 1993; 
Drucker, 1954). Entrepreneurial orientation may be particularly important in co-ops to over-
come an internal risk-avoiding member orientation (Fulton, 1995, Katz, 1997; Kyriakopoulos 
et al., 2004).  Most co-ops have an implicit understanding with their members that they are in-
dependent entrepreneurs who decide on the quality and quantity of produce for which the co-
op firm subsequently will have to find markets. The reengineering of co-op attributes provides 
members with incentives to take the entrepreneurial lead in order to increase co-op perform-
ance by creating the finishing touch in value-added activities, either to the final consumer or 
the final distributor (Van Dijk, 1999). We hypothesize that: 
 
H4: Entrepreneurial orientation of co-ops positively influences co-ops’ performance 
 
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES – MARKET ORIENTATION 
Voting principles of reengineered co-ops may appeal to members’ incentives. For instance, 
members of differing sizes may be motivated to contribute more to the collective allocated eq-
uity, as they may realize that their investment strategy is now represented and rewarded pro-
portionately to their patronage and financial contribution.  Members’ willingness to further in-
vest in co-op activities may enhance co-op attempts to achieve a timely and well-organized 
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response to rapidly changing demands of final markets and, therefore, allow for the creation of 
more market-driven governance structures (Royer, 1995).  Moreover, the assignment of deci-
sion rights to hired managers is expected to stimulate market orientation in co-ops.  The deci-
sion-making in traditionally organized co-ops is more time consuming than in other organiza-
tional forms. It reduces flexibility and creates inertia with respect to the reaction to changing 
market circumstances (Nilsson, 2001).  Professional managers are expected to be aware of the 
importance of being market oriented and retain more resources for the co-op (Russo et al.  
2000).  Sufficient resources and an awareness of their importance seem to suffice in rendering 
the co-op more market-oriented (Meulenberg, 2000).  Furthermore, re-engineered co-ops are 
expected to be more flexible and if they wish to be market oriented, they have to allow more 
entrepreneurial freedom to their management (Van Dijk, 1999). Flexibility stimulates market 
orientation (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). More formally: 
 
H5a: Re-engineered control processes in co-ops positively influence the market orientation 
of co-ops. 
 
Producers have to be willing to fund market-oriented activities (e.g., market research, 
branding, new product development and product differentiation) that generate revenues in the 
long-run (Narver & Slater, 1990).  Although investment in marketing is necessary to gain dis-
tribution on grocery store shelves, co-op members are often reluctant to provide significant eq-
uity capital for investments in their co-op’s marketing program.  The introduction of reengi-
neered ownership principles reduces apathy among members to make long-term investments 
(Hardesty, 2005; Nilsson, 2001).  The nature of the ownership structure of a co-op significantly 
affects member incentives to invest in their organizations (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Kalogeras 
et al. 2007).  Moreover, reengineered co-ops allow non-member investments, particularly, in 
projects which maintain a long-term focus (e.g., through preferred stock offerings and subsidi-
 aries).  This additional capital increases co-ops’ potential to implementing ambitious marketing 
plans. We hypothesize that: 
 
H5b: Reengineered ownership principles in co-ops positively influence the market orienta-
tion of co-ops. 
 
Hendrikse and Bijman (2002) argue that, depending on the market valuation for spe-
cialty products, a self-selection process may develop among the members of a large co-op. 
Members of generic products maintain their membership of the co-op to benefit from counter-
vailing power. Producers of specialty products may abandon the co-op and set up new small 
co-ops to benefit from improved innovation. This situation results in leaving co-ops with fewer 
innovative members thereby resulting in production- rather than market-oriented practices 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2000).  The establishment of obligatory delivery agreements and individual-
ized pricing mechanisms (e.g., paying a premium to members who deliver products of higher 
quality) may help co-ops to deal with the opportunistic behavior of members (Cook & Iliopou-
los, 1999). They may enhance the loyalty and operational efficiency of members and, thus, 
guarantee resources and control mechanisms which enable a co-op to engage in value-added 
activities (e.g., market-oriented activities) and develop products with a good reputation. There-
fore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H5c: Re-engineered cost/ benefit allocation processes in co-ops positively influence the mar-
ket orientation of co-ops. 
 
3.4  STRATEGIC ATTRIBUTES 
Despite arguments that market orientation may inhibit an entrepreneurial orientation 
(Christensen & Bower, 1996), most authors find a positive relationship between entrepreneu-
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rial orientation and market orientation (Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004; Matsuno et al., 2002; Slater 
& Narver, 2000). Entrepreneurial firms – characterized by high levels of innovation, proactive-
ness and risk attitude – are likely to fully exploit new ideas that emerge from market-oriented 
processes (Bhuian, et al. 2005).  This also means that opportunities to meet latent customers’ 
needs may not be missed (Slater & Narver, 1995).  The co-op firm is used to unfold new entre-
preneurial activities with the aim to give added value to the production of its members (Van 
Dijk, 1999). The entrepreneurial orientation of co-ops may increase their ability to pursue ag-
gressive market-oriented activities in order to better serve various (existing and potential) mar-
ket segments (Meulenberg, 2000; Kalogeras et al. 2007).  More formally: 
 
H6: Entrepreneurial orientation of co-ops positively influences the market orientation of co-
ops. 
 
Market orientation stimulates brand orientation because market orientation capabilities 
(e.g., market intelligence) are critical success factors for creation of brands (Keller, 2000; No-
ble et al.  2002). Successful branding can be associated with the understanding of the three di-
mensions of market orientation, namely customers, competitors and organizational processes 
(Noble  et al., 2002). The agribusiness industry may benefit from creating brands that end- 
consumers use as an information and purchasing guide (Hanf & Kühl, 2005). Hardesty (2005) 
discusses how US agrifood co-ops could become more customer-focused through the adapta-
tion of a brand-oriented focus. Co-ops which sell and market branded products have to be par-
ticularly resourceful in creating strong brands. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between 
market orientation and brand orientation of co-ops. More formally: 
  
H7: Market orientation of co-ops positively influences the brand orientation of co-ops.  
 
 Entrepreneurial orientation positively influences brand orientation because innovation 
is important for brand creation (Weerawardena et al., 2006). Being the first to exploit a new 
market segment, a new positioning or a market trend are important elements to firms’ innova-
tiveness and building of successful brands (Doyle, 1990). The entrepreneurial co-op firm has to 
function in a globalized food industry with the top brands as well as in the standard and private 
label products (Van Dijk, 1997).  It is expected that the entrepreneurial orientation of co-op 
firms results in a beneficial interaction with their target customers when investments in brand-
ing are made (Hardesty, 2005). More formally: 
 




4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 SAMPLE 
We selected marketing co-ops (second-order co-ops - ACOs) in Greece. The sampling was de-
rived from relevant information provided through the official list of co-ops by PA.SE.GES. 
Besides ACOs, only first-order co-ops that commercialize all or part of their production them-
selves were included in the sample.1 Based on that stratified criterion, a total of 155 co-op as-
sociations were selected (45 first-order co-ops and 110 ACOs). Following the method of key-
informant we considered that for the case of Greek co-ops, the general managers are the most 
knowledgeable about co-ops’ re-engineering as well as strategic issues. 
A formal structured questionnaire including measures that are discussed in the next sec-
tion was developed. We pre-tested this questionnaire with 6 respondents and no problems were 
encountered.  A mail survey was used to collect data from the general managers of marketing 
co-ops. The response rate was 82%. Only respondents without missing values were included in 
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the analyses and 12 respondents were, therefore, excluded. One hundred and fourteen respon-
dents were used in all the following analyses. 
 
4.2 MEASURES 
The survey contained multiple-item scales to measure the strategic attributes and performance 
and direct questions to measure the re-engineering of co-op attributes.2 Below we discuss in 
more detail these measures for each variable. 
 
Co-op attributes are measured using direct questions that determine whether control, owner-
ship as well as cost/ benefit allocation elements are traditional or re-engineered. For re-
engineered co-ops these questions are answered affirmatively – with a yes (coded as 1) and for 
traditional co-ops these questions are answered in the negative – with a no (coded as 0). 
Control attribute was measured using two questions: one about voting rights and one 
about decision-making responsibility. The voting element can be traditional “one member one 
vote” (0) or re-engineered “proportional voting based on patronage” (1). The decision-making 
responsibility was measured by employing the scale of Andrian and Green (2001) adapted to 
the context of this study. Managers were provided with 11 activities and asked to determine 
whether responsibility for these activities falls upon the BOD or the manager. Each activity is 
scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“board most responsible”) to 5 (“manager most re-
sponsible”). These 11 variables were included in a Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The 
scree-plot suggests that a one-component solution is appropriate. All items had a loading 
higher than 0.563 on the first component and the first component accounts for 59 % of the 
variance. Cronbach’s Alpha equalled 0.93. The mean score of the 11 activities was used for 
further analyses. 
Ownership attribute was  measured using 7 questions about alignment of equity with 
patronage, transferability of ownership rights, 2 questions on the appraisal of ownership rights, 
 exit barriers, and 2 questions on the outside capital. For re-engineered co-ops these questions 
are answered with a yes (1) and for traditional co-ops these questions are answered with a no 
(0). 
Finally cost/ benefit allocation was measured by asking 4 questions: two about prices 
paid to members and two about obligatory delivery agreements. The obligatory delivery 
agreements were determined by asking whether members are obliged to deliver their entire 
production to the co-op (based on contractual arrangements) and by asking whether members 
face sanctions in case of non delivery of the quantities set by the agreement. The answers to 
these 2 questions are highly associated (Cramer’s V = 0.22, p < 0.001)3.  If co-ops have 
adopted either of the two arrangements, the newly formed variable was assigned a value of 1 
(re-engineered), whereas if co-ops have adopted neither, this variable was assigned a value of 0 
(traditional) (Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004). 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation captures three elements: innovativeness, proactiveness and risk 
taking. The 9-item scale was developed by Covin and Slevin (1986). These 9 items were 
slightly modified (e.g., wording) to be comprehensible for the respondents. All items are 
scored on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The scree plot in the PCA suggests that a one- or two-
factor solution is appropriate. In line with the original conceptualization of Covin and Slevin 
(1986) we chose the one factor solution. Based on the PCA, 2 reverse coded items were ex-
cluded from further analysis. Afterwards, all items had a loading higher than 0.50 on the first 
component, which accounts for 53% of the variance. Cronbach’s Alpha was found to equal 
0.85. The mean score of the 7 items was used for further analysis. 
 
Market orientation pertaining to the cultural perspective on market orientation was measured 
using 7 items. We used the cultural perspective rather than the behavioural perspective on mar-
ket orientation because it provides a better explanation for the variations in business perform-
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ance than the behavioural perspective (Oczkowski & Farrell, 1998). The cultural perspective 
on market orientation has been conceptualized as a one dimension construct (Hult et al., 2005; 
Narver & Slater, 1990). The scree plot in a PCA suggests that a one-factor solution is appropri-
ate. All items had a loading higher than 0.67 and the construct was sufficiently reliable.  Cron-
bach’s Alpha was equal to 0.81. The mean score of the seven items was used for further analy-
sis. 
 
Brand orientation was measured using 5 items adopted from Matear et al. (2004). An addi-
tional item was added to measure the extent to which co-ops invest into new brands according 
to member perceptions.  Matear et al. (2004) suggest that the perceptions of all involved actors 
(e.g., investors, managers, employees) should be in harmony to serve as a basis for a truly 
brand-oriented company. The scree plot in a PCA suggests that the one-factor solution is ap-
propriate. All items had a loading higher than 0.79 and the first factor accounts for 65% of the 
variance. Cronbach’s Alpha was found equal to 0.89. The mean score of the items was used for 
further analysis. The brand orientation scale was also checked for consistency with the existing 
percentage of branded products marketed by co-ops. The correlation between the percentage of 
branded products and brand orientation is good (Pearson’s r = 0.41, p < 0.001). 
 
Performance was measured by a 3-item scale developed by Cadogan et al. (2002).  This scale 
measures the respondents’ level of satisfaction with respect to three performance indicators in 
the last three years, namely sales volume, new market entry and market share. The items of the 
scale were slightly modified for the purpose of this study because the original ones relate to 
export activities. We generated 4 additional items: organizational performance as perceived by 
management, organizational performance as perceived by members in terms of growth, and in 
terms of turnover, and performance in relation to profitability. PCA indicated two underlying 
components. One reverse-coded item had a low loading on both components after rotation and 
 was excluded from further analyses. We re-ran the PCA, which again yielded two underlying 
components. In the un-rotated solution, however, all items load higher than 0.65 on the first 
component and this component explains 57% of the variance. Cronbach’s Alpha for the 6-item 
scale was found to equal 0.84, which could not be improved by deleting one more item. The 
mean score of the 6 items was used for further analysis. 
 
4    MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS. 
In table 1 the percentages that show the adoption of organizational innovations appear next to 
each attribute element entailed in the traditional co-op model (as before, the introduction and 
application of NHA 2810/2000) and the re-engineered co-op model (after the introduction and 
application of NHA 2810/2000). The results reveal that the most marketing co-ops in Greece 
have only partially adopted organizational innovations.  The vast majority of them maintain a 
traditional voting system (80%) and allow only members to claim rights on preferred shares 
(95.6%) and downstream investments in subsidiaries (75.2%). Also, most co-ops do not allow 
transferability of rights (74,0%) and appraisal of rights based on interest remuneration (96,8%). 
Seventy-three percent of them do not apply exit barriers and 70.7% do not apply differential 
cost-pricing policy. Slightly more than half of the co-ops impose obligatory delivery agree-
ments (56.8%), sanctions (57,3%), and apply equity investment alignments (55,0%).  
Only a few among the plethora of organizational innovations introduced by the NHA 
2810/2000 were adopted by marketing co-ops. Specifically, almost all examined co-ops 
(95,6%) implement rights appraisal through changes in membership fees and 60% of them ap-
ply a differential pricing policy. 
Table 2 depicts the results for the hypothesized relationships developed in the previous 
section. The results were obtained by ordinary least squares regression. An F-test is used to test 
specific hypotheses regarding groupings of explanatory variables (i.e., co-op attribute ele-
ments) (Maddala, 1989). In the first column of table 2 the explanatory variables are presented. 
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The second column in table 2 indicates the coefficients of the variables hypothesized to explain 
co-ops’ performance. Overall, the results show that the regression model is significant (F = 
5.99, p < 0.001, Adjusted-R2 = .41). 
The first hypothesis, H1a, which predicts that re-engineered control elements positively 
influence performance (F = 0.860, p = 0.52) is not supported. Decision-making responsibility 
is marginally significant when a one-sided significance test (β = 0.14, p = 0.06) is performed.  
Likewise, H1b (re-engineered ownership attribute positively influence performance) is not 
supported (F = 0.766, p = 0.67) and only the alignment of equity with patronage (β = 0.33, p = 
0.07) and the appraisal of ownership rights (interest) (β = 0.72, p = 0.07) are marginally sig-
nificant when a one-sided significance test is performed. Again, H1c (re-engineered cost/ bene-
fit allocations positively influence performance) is not supported (F = 0.674, p = 0.64). None 
of the predictors relating to cost/benefit allocation characteristics has a significant influence on 
performance.  In contrast to the very limited support of the general thesis stating that re-
engineered co-op elements positively influence performance, H2, H3 and H4 predict that mar-
ket orientation (β = 0.32, p = 0.02), brand orientation (β = 0.26, p < 0.01) and entrepreneurial 
orientation (β = 0.26, p < 0.01) enhance the performance of co-ops. 
The third column in table 2 presents the results regarding the determinants of market 
orientation. Results show that the model is overall significant (F = 4.39, p < 0.001) with Ad-
justed-R2 = .30. However, the findings indicate no support for H5a (re-engineered control at-
tributes positively influence market orientation; F =0.469, p = 0.83) and H5b (re-engineered 
ownership positively influences market orientation; F = 1.337, p = 0.45).  Only the ownership 
element regarding exit barriers (β = 0.24,  p = 0.08) has a marginally significant (i.e., one-sided 
test is performed) and positive influence on market orientation, while claims through preferred 
shares (β  = -0.53, p = 0.065) has a marginally but negative significant influence on market ori-
entation. Also, H5c (re-engineered cost/ benefit allocations influence market orientation of co-
ops) receives no support (F = 1.681,  p = 0.42). Only differentiated prices paid to members (β = 
 0.28, p = 0.045) has a positive influence on market orientation when a one-sided significance 
test is performed. Finally, entrepreneurial orientation is the single most influential variable that 
explains market orientation of co-ops (β = 0.29, p < 0.01), supporting hypothesis H6. 
Finally, the fourth column in Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis per-
formed to test the third group of hypotheses concerning the remainder influences among strate-
gic attributes. Results show that this model is also overall significant (F =  3.67, p < 0.001, Ad-
justed-R2 = .26). Both, H7 (market orientation positively influences brand orientation) and H8  
(entrepreneurial orientation influences brand orientation) are supported (H7:  β = 0.56, p < 




This paper is among the first to systematically examine influences among organizational at-
tributes, strategic attributes and the performance of co-ops.  We developed an actual classifica-
tion scheme for providing detailed perspectives on whether and how re-engineered co-op at-
tributes influence market orientation and performance. We further investigated the influences 
of strategic attributes on performance as well as influences among strategic attributes. While 
this research is considered as one of the first attempts to make-up an actual classification 
scheme and based on this to explore several relationships in the light of a policy reform, we 
hope the results obtained will be helpful to researchers and practitioners alike. Several chal-
lenging insights emerge from the findings of the current study. 
First, marketing co-ops in Greece seem to be reluctant to adopt organizational innova-
tions introduced by policy reforms. Although some of them have adopted innovations related 
mainly to cost/benefits allocation, most of them maintain a traditional governance and owner-
ship structure even after the implementation of the NHA 2810/2000. This delayed adoption 
may raise the fundamental questions on whether policy reforms reflect the widely accepted 
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preferences of market participants (e.g., producers-members of co-ops) and whether and to 
what extent organizational change regarding co-op entrepreneurship in Greece drives, or is 
driven, by legal change. Based on our in-depth discussions with several co-op experts and 
managers regarding co-op entrepreneurial behavior in Greece, some facts (which were beyond 
the scope of the current research to be analyzed) were apparent. For instance, one might con-
sider looking at some socio-economic dimensions of agribusiness development in the country.  
The high degree of micro-opportunistic political interventions and the missing social cohesive-
ness between co-op actors in Greece might determine the low speed with which Greek co-o-
ops abandon their traditional-organized structures (personal contact, 2006). 
Second, the findings indicate that only a few among the examined elements of re-
engineered elements have a (marginal) positive influence on performance. Particularly, the 
managerial decision-making responsibility, appraisal of ownership rights, and the alignment of 
equity with patronage have a positive influence (albeit marginal in all three cases) on co-op’s 
performance.  These results may imply that these new organizational innovations are economi-
cally attractive to the corporate management of agribusiness co-ops in Greece and lead to cost-
efficient contractual arrangements between co-ops and their members. Both professional man-
agement which acquires a high degree of market expertise (Cook, 1994; Van Dijk, 1996; An-
drian & Green, 2001) and structural elements of new generation co-ops (NGCs), such as the 
alignment of equity with patronage and appreciation of ownership rights, have been analyzed 
in co-op literature as critical success factors for the performance of co-ops (Harris et al.1996; 
Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; Van Bekkum, 2001). 
Moreover, differentiated pricing and establishment of exit barriers have a (marginally) 
positive influence on the market orientation of co-ops. As Reynolds (1997), Cook and Iliopou-
los (2000), Nilsson (2001) and van Bekkum (2001), Kalogeras et al. (2009), among others, 
have analyzed, ownership and cost/benefit  agreements that tie-up member economic resources 
to corporate operational (e.g., delivery agreements, exit barriers) and functional activities (e.g., 
 pricing policies) help co-ops to stabilize their supply flows for serving specific market seg-
ments.  This situation implies that the re-engineering of co-op structures should stimulate 
member investments in the long-run in order to serve and target effectively and efficiently their 
existing and potential customers. Although, building-up market-oriented co-op structures re-
quires capital-intensive strategic plans and tactics that may result in reductions of member pro-
ceeds in the short run (Hardesty, 2005), these types of investments often reinforce co-ops’ per-
formance in the long-run and provide sustainable competitive advantages (Nilsson, 2001, 
Kalogeras et al., 2007). The finding that entrepreneurial orientation has a strong influence on 
the market orientation of co-ops also enhances  the view that co-ops’ involvement in innova-
tive, proactive and risk-bearing activities are the means for pursuing and implementing aggres-
sive marketing strategies (Van Dijk, 1999; Meulenberg, 2000). This is apparent in the case of 
agribusiness co-ops in Greece which are challenged to abandon their passive-oriented market 
role and create conditions for the development of a new entrepreneurial lead in their internal 
and external markets by becoming proactive and taking the necessary risks associated with 
their economic growth. 
Finally, our results suggest that some strategic attributes of co-ops substantially influ-
ence some others. The entrepreneurial orientation and market orientation of co-ops positively 
and significantly affect their brand orientation. These results are in line with past analytical and 
descriptive work which emphasizes the importance of customer-focused strategies of agrifood 
co-ops (e.g., Peterson & Anderson, 1996; Meleunberg, 1979, 1998) such as their branding 
(Hardesty, 2005). The competitive, innovative and proactive attitude that co-op firms should 
develop seem to influence their strategies and tactics aiming at the increase of customers’ 
awareness and associations (Hanf & Kühl, 2005).  These results also confirm recent advances 
in marketing-management sciences (e.g., Doyle, 1990; Keller, 2000; Noble et al., 2002; Ver-
hees & Meulenberg, 2004; Weerawardena et al., 2006) regarding the role of market and entre-
preneurial orientation as stimulators of brand orientation. 
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Implications 
On balance, the results confirm and extend previous work on the influences among organiza-
tional attributes, strategic attributes and the performance of co-ops. These results may have im-
plications for the continuing research of co-op organizational and strategic attributes. For re-
searchers, this study will hopefully stimulate the use of empirical methodologies accounting for 
qualitative and quantitative observations/inputs in determining and providing detailed perspec-
tives on co-ops’ reengineering and strategic behavior. The results of the current study provide 
only partial evidence (some marginally significant relationships) that re-engineered attributes 
resulting from a policy reform influence performance while it provides strong evidence that 
strategic attributes influence the performance of co-ops. More research that examines the influ-
ences among different combinations of specific re-engineered attributes and strategic attributes 
on the performance of different types of co-ops (e.g., supply co-ops, services co-ops) in the 
light of other environmental conditions (e.g., technological changes; market-structure changes) 
is needed. Also, comparative research investigating the influences of a set of structural and 
strategic attributes on the economic performance of co-ops using both subjective and objective 
measures may prove particularly useful to the understanding of structural re-engineering and 
strategic behavior of co-ops. 
 This work may also be helpful to policy-makers, BoD members and managers of co-ops 
who are often challenged to cope with the re-engineering of specific organizational and strate-
gic processes of co-ops under differing environmental conditions. Our study predicts that stra-
tegic attributes enhance performance much more than the re-engineered organizational attrib-
utes do. Greek co-ops are challenged to pursue and implement entrepreneurial, market and 
brand-oriented strategies no matter how difficult or expensive the adoption and implementation 
of these strategies might be. That is to say, aggressive marketing strategies eventually add 
value to product-market combinations of co-ops and, hence, the value-focused thinking and 
market orientation of co-ops can lead to substantial profits which benefit the members. How-
 ever, the co-alignment of specific control, ownership and cost/benefit elements with these 
strategies should always be carefully considered and explored. Although it is beyond the scope 
of the current study and it is not easy in practice to make formulations of how specific re-
engineered organizational and strategic attributes enhance the performance and the market be-
haviour of co-ops, the findings of the current study might provide some useful guidance. For 
instance, the creation of entrepreneurial values and attitude (e.g., innovative, proactive and risk 
taking behavior) within the internal and external environment of co-ops and to a lesser extent, 
the use of professional management at the corporate level, the establishment of exit barriers, 
the alignment of equity with patronage, and differentiated pricing policies, might constitute 
only some of the first steps that agribusiness co-ops in Greece should follow in order to im-
prove their performance. Finally, the influence of other strategic attributes, such as the brand 
orientation on co-ops’ performance, might highlight that co-ops are also challenged to develop 
brands that play a recognizable and trusted role in building customer loyalty. 
 
Limitations 
The current study is subject to limitations inherent in this type of research. The use of an induc-
tive approach for making-up a dichotomous classification scheme allowed us to conduct a de-
tailed investigation of the influences of various re-engineered attribute elements on strategic at-
tributes and co-op performance. This classification scheme may redeem the inherent weakness 
of the cross-sectional nature of our empirical study. Cross-sectional empirical research, unlike 
longitudinal research, does not allow for the investigation of causal relationships. Yet, the ac-
tual classification scheme used partly compensates for the inability to establish causality be-
tween the various relationships that are not well-grounded in theory. At this juncture, future re-
search may re-examine the hypotheses put forward in this study by using a longitudinal 
research design. 
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Other limitations of this study stem from our conceptualization. First, we contended 
that businesses that are more entrepreneurial, market, and brand-oriented are best positioned 
for success under all environmental conditions. However, this study did not aim at studying 
whether the hypothesized relationships (e.g., the relationship between market orientation and 
performance) are moderated by other micro or macro economic conditions or not. Future re-
search may consider the influence (direct or not) of other environmental conditions (i.e., het-
erogeneity in co-op participants preferences or external competitive forces) associated with the 
inherently re-engineered processes and strategic behavior of co-ops. Second, we conceptual-
ized and tested that specific strategic attributes influence the performance of co-ops. The exten-
sion of this framework, by hypothesizing that specific elements of strategic attributes enhance 
performance, may be another important step in furthering our understanding regarding the stra-
tegic orientation of co-ops. For instance, co-op’s innovative, proactive, or risk behavior might 
reveal interesting insights on whether and to which direction the entrepreneurial orientation of 
co-ops should be developed. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Hopefully, the current research contributes to a better understanding of re-engineering, strate-
gic behavior and performance of marketing co-ops in agribusiness. The recognition that re-
engineered co-op attributes do not influence co-ops’ performance as much as strategic attrib-
utes do, raises two questions. The first one, as Kyriakopoulos et al. (2004) mentioned, is 
whether the influence of the re-engineered structures on the performance has been over-
emphasized in the co-op literature. And the second one is whether emphasis in co-op theory 
and practice should also be placed on the strategies and tactics that co-ops should adopt and 
implement in order to capture market benefits. We believe that only after BoD members and 
managers of co-ops have assessed the impact of a series of attribute elements on the perform-
ance of their co-ops can they attempt to make necessary changes in the organizational structure 
 of co-ops and set-up strategic marketing planning processes. We hope that this research high-
lights the need that the study and practice for the re-engineering of agribusiness co-ops should 
account not only for structural but also for strategic dimensions and characteristics. 
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  as before NHA 2810/2000 
Re-engineered:a  
after NHA 2810 introduction 
   Control    
 
Voting  rule 
 








BoD and Experts  
    Ownership   
Entry fees No Yes 
 




Members only (95.6%) Non-members also (6.4%) 
Claim to ownership rights 2/subsidiaryc Members only (75.2%) Non-members also (24.8%) 
Equity investment-patronage alignment  No (55.0%) Yes (45.0%) 
Transferability of rights No (74.0%) Yes (26.0%) 
Tradable ownership rights    No  No 
Redeemable ownership rights  Yes Yes 
Appraisal of rights 1 / interest  No (96.8%) Yes (3.2%) 
Appraisal of rights 2/change in fee No (4.0%) Yes (96.0%) 
Net Income d Through Price Through Price and Dividends 
Exit barriers No (73.0%) Yes (27.0%) 
     Cost/Benefit Allocation  
Nature of the delivery agreement Non-obligatory (56.8%) Obligatory (43.2%) 
Sanctions No (57.3%) Yes (42.7%) 
Differential pricing Equal (42.4%) Differentiated (57.6%) 
Differential cost pricing Equal (70.7%) Differentiated (29.3%) 
a The percentages relate to each attribute of the three organizational principles. 
b There is no percentage for this attribute, as corporate decision-making was measured through a 5-point likert 
scale. 
c The attribute “claim to ownership rights” was divided into two attributes; 1) claim through preferred shares and 
2) claim through subsidiaries, as members (and external investors) can claim ownership rights through these two 
different ways. 
d Net income is allocated through price and dividends in all cooperatives (unless the general assembly decides that 
net income is retained for other purposes, e.g., an investment project). 
 
 Table 2. Regression Parameter Estimates 




Strategic Attributes    
Brand orientation 0.25***   
Market orientation 0.26**  0.56*** 
Entrepreneurial orientation 0.29*** 0.29***  0.37*** 
Organizational Attributes    
   Control    
Voting rule 0.11 0.04  
Decision-making  0.14* -0.06  
   Ownership     
Claim 1(preferred shares) -0.20 -0.53#  
Claim 2 (subsidiary) -0.13 -0.13  
Equity-patronage alignment   0.33* -0.02  
Transferable ownership rights -0.16 -0.22  
Appraisal 1/interest 0.72* 0.37  
Appraisal 2/change in fee -0.18 0.06  
Exit barriers -0.23 0.24*  
   Cost/Benefit Allocation     
Nature of delivery agreement / 
Sanctionsa 
0.12 0.20  
Differentiated pricing  -0.29 0.28**  
Differentiated cost pricing 0.21 -0.23  
Adjusted-R2 0.41 0.30  0.26 
F statistic 5.99*** 4.39***  3.67*** 
N 114 114 114 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (one-sided tests), # p < 0.1 (two-sided test) 
a As mentioned in paragraph 4.2, the two attributes “nature of delivery agreement” and “sanctions” were com-
bined into a new variable. 
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APPENDIX: MEASUREMENT SCALES USED IN THE RESEARCH 
 
The adaptations of each respective item to the context of this survey can be seen 
in italics. 
 
Market orientation as a cultural approach (Market Orientation) [scale used by Hult et 
al. (2005).] 
 
 [Seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’] 
 
Competitor orientation [adapted from Narver and Slater (1990)] 
• Our salespeople (e.g. hired personnel from the sales department) regularly share information 
concerning competitors’ strategies. 
• Top management (e.g. The General Manager) regularly discusses competitors’ strengths and 
strategies. 
 
Customer orientation [adapted from Narver and Slater (1990)] 
• Our business objectives are driven primarily by customer satisfaction. 
• Our strategies are driven by beliefs about how we can create greater value for customers. 
• We measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently. 
 
Interfunctional coordination [adapted from Narver and Slater (1990)] 
• All of our operations and functions (“business functions” in the original scale) are integrated 
in serving the needs of our target markets. 
• All of our business functions are responsive to each other’s needs and requests. 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation   [derived from Barringer and Bluedorn (1999). Items origi-
nally developed by Covin and Slevin (1991) and Naman and Slevin (1993)] 
 
[Seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’] 
 
Innovation  
 Managers (e.g. The General Manager) place a strong emphasis on innovation. 
 Our cooperative over the last five years marketed many new products/services.  
 Changes in our products/services over the last five years have been dramatic. 
 
Proactiveness 
 Our cooperative initiates actions to which competitors respond. 
 When dealing with competitors our cooperative typically initiates action. 
 Our cooperative typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a “live and let 
live” posture. (reverse-coded item)  * 
 
Risk attitude 
 Managers (e.g. The General Manager) have a strong tendency for high risk investments. 
 Managers (e.g. The General Manager) believe that bold changes are necessary to achieve 
the firm’s objectives. 
 Managers in our cooperative favor a “wait and see” posture in order to minimize the prob-




[scale derived from Aaker (1992) and validated by Matear et al. (2004)] 
 
[Seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’] 
 
 In our cooperative we invest significantly in managing and promoting the reputation/image 
of our cooperative. 
 In our cooperative we invest significantly in customer loyalty programs. 
 In our cooperative we invest significantly in research into internal perceptions about our 
brand(s) (perception of frontline staff, core service providers, management, personnel). 
 In our cooperative we invest significantly in research into external perceptions about our 
brand(s) (perceptions of customers, intermediaries, suppliers). 
 In our cooperative we invest significantly in research into perceptions about our brand(s) 
by the members-farmers of our cooperative (new item).  
 
 
Decision – making Responsibility  [scale of Andrian and Green (2001)] 
 
[The response rankings are defined as follows: 1 = board most responsible, 2 = board more re-
sponsible, 3 = board and manager equally responsible, 4 = manager more responsible and 5 = 
manager most responsible].  
 
Decision-making responsibility  
 
Area of Responsibility  
1. Setting the direction of the business for the welfare of the cooperative members  
2. Managing the day-to-day operations of the cooperative  
3. Maintaining accuracy of the minutes of the board of directors’ meetings (not included) 
4. Acting in good faith with reasonable care in handling the affairs of the cooperative (not in-
cluded)  
5. Ensuring employees understand cooperative philosophy  
6. Approving purchase of major capital assets (not included)  
7. Developing programs for implementation of cooperative policies  
8. Establishment and evaluation of programs  
9. Furnishing information needed for long range planning  
10. Educating the general public about the cooperative and its activities 
11. Keeping current on legislation concerning cooperatives  
12. Encouraging membership and active patronage  
13. Informing members – farmers of developments within the cooperative  






Perceived performance  
[Seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’] 
 
 Our cooperative performs better than our competitors. 
 The members-farmers of our cooperative think that our cooperative performs better than 
our competitors. 
 Relative to our competitors, our cooperative is less profitable (in this question please try to 
think the cooperative as a company) (reverse-coded item) * 
 Relative to our competitors, our cooperative is growing faster (in turnover terms). 
 
 
Performance in relation to objectives [items derived from Cadogan et al. (2002)] 
 
[Seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’] 
 
 How satisfied are you with your cooperatives’ performance over the past three years, in 
terms of your sales volume? 
 How satisfied are you with your cooperatives’ performance over the past three years, in 
terms of your new market entry? 
 How satisfied are you with your cooperatives’ performance over the past three years, in 
terms of your market share? 
 
 
* Denotes items dropped during analysis 
 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Our sample contains co-ops that only sell and market the produce of their members and do 
not present any type variation in activities (e.g., supply vs. marketing co-ops). That is, we do 
not control for the type of co-op in our modelling framework. 
 
2 The survey measures as used in the final questionnaire are available upon request to the au-
thors. 
 
3 Cramer's V is a statistic measuring the strength of association or dependency between two 
(nominal) categorical variables in a contingency table. 
 
 
